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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article sketches the history of social enterprise legal forms in the
United States and provides suggestions regarding their continued
evolution. Social enterprises—companies that blend profit and social
purpose—have a long history in the United States, but not until 2008 did
a state pass a social enterprise specific statute. In that year, Vermont passed
a statute allowing for formation of L3Cs, low-profit limited liability
companies.1 The L3C was aimed primarily at funding issues for social
enterprises and attempted to unlock program related investments (PRIs)
for that purpose. Following the L3C form were a number of variations on
a corporation-based social enterprise: social purpose corporations, benefit
corporations, and public benefit corporations. These forms evolved over
the past decade to address the issues of corporate purpose and social
accountability. Lastly, a small handful of states passed benefit limited
liability company (BLLC) statutes for companies that desired a form
similar to the benefit corporation but built on an LLC framework.
Since 2008, a few thousand companies have been formed under these
social enterprise statutes, and a few of these companies have recently
raised significant capital or gone public.2 Yet, even at a time when the
Business Roundtable has declared an increased focus on social purpose,
these forms have not gained significant mainstream adoption. In addition,
J. Haskell Murray is an Associate Professor of Management and Business Law at
Belmont University. For their comments and conversations about this Article, the Author
thanks the participants at the University of Tennessee’s Connecting the Threads IV
Symposium. The opinions expressed and any errors made are solely those of the author.
1 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 3001(27) (2009).
2 Frederick H. Alexander, Saving Investors from Themselves: How Stockholder Primacy
Harms Everyone, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 303, 314 (2017); Benefit Corporations Raising Capital,
BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/benefit-corporations-raising-capital (last
visited Mar. 8, 2021); Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Public Markets, THE CLS
BLUE SKY BLOG (July 31, 2017), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/31/be
nefit-corporations-and-public-markets/.
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many commentators doubt the ability of the statutes to ensure production
of social good. After relaying a brief history of social enterprise forms,
this Article suggests that it is the possibility of shifting norms, not law,
that is the true hope of social enterprise forms. For these norms to have
staying power, however, additional accountability measures need to be
added. More specifically, the Article suggests increasing stakeholder
rights,3 realigning director incentives, and strengthening social reporting.4
II. UNINCORPORATED FORMS OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
A. Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies (L3C)
The first social enterprise form in the United States was the L3C.5
Original advocates for the L3C form—Bob Lang and those associated
with his Americans for Community Development organization—
envisioned the L3C as a way to attract funding through PRIs and other
social-focused investments.6 PRIs are one way that foundations can satisfy
their 5% annual distribution requirement.7 Generally, jeopardy
investments have not counted toward foundations’ distribution
requirements, but PRIs are an exception to this general rule if: (1) the
primary purpose is charitable; (2) “[n]o significant purpose of the
investment is the production of income or the appreciation of property”;
and (3) the purpose is not to influence legislation or elections.8
Foundations, however, have not taken full use of PRIs because of the cost
in making sure their investment is properly used and the significant tax
3 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 89, 127–31 (2015) (making arguments in favor of stakeholder standing).
4 See generally J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV.
25, 26 (2015); J. Haskell Murray, Examining Tennessee's for-Profit Benefit Corporation Law, 19
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 325, 339–42 (2017).
5 J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited
Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in
Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 283 (2010); J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise
and Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial Interests?, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 765, 767
(2017).
6 I.R.C. §§ 4942(d)–(g), 4944; Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C,
History, Basic Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15, 17 (2010); Robert M. Lang,
Jr., The L3C: The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and Mission Driven Organizations,
36 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 251, 253–56 (2007); Concept, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV.,
https://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/concept/(last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
7 I.R.C. § 4942(g).
8 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-3(a)(1) (2016).

2021]

THE HISTORY AND HOPE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE FORMS

209

consequences for noncompliance.9 The L3C proponents hoped that by
transliterating the PRI regulation language into the L3C statutes they could
create a safe harbor for PRIs for foundations.10
Relatively soon after the passage of the first L3C statute, various legal
commentators started writing in opposition to the L3C form.11 These
critics primarily focused on the fact that the L3C had not been granted
special status for PRI investments, and that L3Cs should not be granted
special status because the enforcement mechanisms for ensuring
charitable purpose were lacking.12 Other authors discussed ways to
improve the L3C statutes, but nearly no academic commentators wrote in
unreserved support of the statutes as passed.13
The Internal Revenue Service has not granted a blanket safe harbor
for L3Cs, bringing the movement to a near standstill in recent years.14 The
last L3C state statute was passed in 2012 in Rhode Island, and North
Carolina repealed its L3C statute in 2014.15 In total, eight states, three

9 I.R.C.

§ 4942(a).
AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV., supra note 6.
11 Carter G. Bishop, The Low Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or
Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV. 243, 250 (2010); Callison & Vestal, supra note 5, at 274–75;
Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor's New Clothes” on the Low-Profit
Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 879 (2010); David S. Chernoff, L3Cs:
Less than Meets the Eye, 21 TAX'N EXEMPTS, May–June 2010, at 3, 4-5.
12 Bishop, supra note 11, at 250; Callison & Vestal, supra note 5, at 274–75;
Kleinberger, supra note 11, at 879; Chernoff, supra note 11, at 4–5.
13 Cassady V. Brewer, Seven Ways to Strengthen and Improve the L3C, 25 REGENT U. L.
REV. 329, 332–33 (2013); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit:
Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability
Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 42–51 (2011). But see Lang & Minnigh, supra note 6, at
21–22.
14 Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 619, 647 (2010) (“The IRS has not yet issued any such blanket ruling, and some
recent comments suggest their possible unease with doing so.”) (citing Mark Hrywna, The
L3C Status: Groups Explore Structure that Limits Liability for Program-Related Investing, THE
NONPROFIT TIMES (Sept. 1, 2009), https://www.thenonprofittimes.com/npt_articles/
the-l3c-status (reporting IRS personnel “warn[ing] against jumping on the LC3
bandwagon too early because of unresolved tax questions”)).
15 L3C
Info and Latest L3C Tally, INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C,
https://www.intersectorl3c.com/l3c (last updated June 5, 2020).
10
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Native American tribes, and Puerto Rico have active L3C statutes.16 As of
June 2020, there are reportedly over 1,700 L3Cs.17
B. Benefit Limited Liability Companies (BLLC)
and Benefit Limited Partnerships
BLLC laws have been passed in five states—Maryland, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Utah.18 Delaware has also passed a benefit
limited partnership statute.19 The proponents of the benefit corporation
form, discussed below, do not seem to be advocating loudly for the BLLC
or benefit limited partnership statutes at this time, acknowledging that the
LLC and LP forms are flexible enough to accommodate social
entrepreneurs.20 Nevertheless, some smaller businesses that should
probably use an LLC or LP framework instead of a corporate one seem
to want the social signal of benefit entities.21 Some scholars have argued
that the benefit LLC form is not only useless, but that it improperly implies
that conventional forms of business are “detriment” entities.22 Others
admit that the BLLC is legally unnecessary, but focus on the norm-shifting
potential of the entity and the desire for an LLC-based benefit statute to
go alongside the already prevalent benefit corporation statutes.23
16Laws,

AMERICANS FOR CMTY. DEV., https://americansforcommunitydevelopme
nt.org/laws/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
17 INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, supra note 15.
18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1201–1208 (2018); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 11-4A-1201–
1208, 11-1-502, 5-6C-03 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.750–.770 (2014); 15 PENN. CONS.
STAT. §§ 8891–8898 (2016); http://delcode.delaware.gov/title6/c018/sc12/index.shtml
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 60.750–770 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-4-101–402 (West 2018).
19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1202 (2019).
20 See, e.g., FREDERICK H. ALEXANDER, BENEFIT CORPORATION LAW AND
GOVERNANCE: PURSUING PROFIT WITH PURPOSE 154–55 (Todd Manza ed., 2017).
21 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV.
387, 402 n.62 (2014) (noting the passage of benefit LLC law and citing to articles showing
companies using the statute).
22 Mohsen Manesh, Introducing the Totally Unnecessary Benefit LLC, 97 N.C. L. REV. 603,
649–50, 670 (2019) (“The problem is that existing benefit entity statutes offer no
accountability—no means for the public to ensure that a benefit entity will pursue or
produce public benefit any more or differently than a business organized as a
conventional corporation or LLC.”).
23 ALEXANDER, supra note 20 (admitting the benefit LLC is not technically necessary,
but noting the potential “branding” benefit of the form); J. Haskell Murray, Beneficial
Benefit LLCs?, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 437, 437 (2017) (“the benefit LLC entity type is largely
unnecessary, but also not particularly harmful”).
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III. CORPORATION-BASED FORMS OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE:
CERTIFIED B CORPORATIONS V. BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
Before discussing benefit corporations, they should be distinguished
from Certified B Corporations, as both are sometimes confusingly
referred to as “B Corps.”24 Further, some of the highest profile social
enterprises, like Patagonia, are both Certified B Corporations and benefit
corporations.25
Certified B Corporations are curated by the nonprofit organization B
Lab and are a certification in the vein of Fair Trade or Leadership in
Energy and Environmental Design (LEED).26 To obtain the B Corp
certification, the entity must score at least an eighty on a 200-point B
Impact Assessment (BIA), publicly post their BIA, meet certain legal
requirements to clearly allow stakeholder consideration, and pay B Lab a
fee.27 B Lab audits 10% of the recertifying Certified B Corporations each
year.28 B Lab will certify a variety of business forms, including partnerships
and LLCs, making the “B Corporation” moniker somewhat misleading.29
24 Jen Barnette, So You Want to Be a “B Corp”—What Does That Mean?, COOLEY GO,
https://www.cooleygo.com/b-corp-what-does-that-mean/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2021)
(“The term ‘B Corp’ is often used interchangeably to refer to both benefit corporations
and Certified B Corporations, but these are actually distinct.”); Benefit Corporations &
Certified B Corps, B LAB, https://benefitcorp.net/businesses/benefit-corporations-andcertified-b-corps (last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (“Benefit corporations and Certified B
Corporations are often confused.”); see also J. Haskell Murray, Etsy Becomes a Certified B
Corporation, THE CONGLOMERATE (May 9, 2012), https://www.theconglomerate.org/2
012/05/etsy-becomes-a-certified-b-corporation.html (noting that even Etsy confused
the two terms in its press release announcing its B Corp Certification, incorrectly
announcing that they had become a benefit corporation).
25 B Lab, PATAGONIA, https://www.patagonia.com/b-lab.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2021).
26 Ryan Honeyman, What’s the Difference Between Certified B Corps and Benefit Corps?,
TRIPLE PUNDIT, (Aug. 26, 2014) https://www.triplepundit.com/story/2014/whatsdifference-between-certified-b-corps-and-benefit-corps/41336 (describing the goals of
Certified B Corporations). See generally About B Corps, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/a
bout-b-corps (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
27 Certification Requirements, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/certification/meet-therequirements (last visited Mar. 8, 2021).
28 Id.
29 Presumably, B Lab will even certify an S-Corp., giving you a B.S. Corporation.
Criticism or praise for that joke should be sent to Professor Cass Brewer at Georgia State
University. See US—LLC/LLP/L3C—Yes, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/usllcllpl3c-yes (last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (listing qualifications for LLC, LLP, and L3Cs to
become certified as B Corps).
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As of February 2021, there were over 3,800 Certified B Corps.30 The fees
for certification range from $1,000 to over $50,000 per year, depending on
the revenue of the business.31 The benefits of certification revolve around
branding,32 networking,33 product discounts,34 attracting talent,35 and a few
small local tax credits.36
The benefit corporation form is a legal entity type allowed by state
statute. B Lab, which certifies B Corporations, as discussed above, has
been spearheading the passage of benefit corporation legislation. Neither
certification nor a social audit are required to use the benefit corporation
form.37 No extra fee, beyond the typical state fee for formation, is required.
According to the vast majority of the benefit corporation statutes, a thirdCertified B Corporation, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/ (listing 3,821 Certified B
Corporations on Mar. 8, 2021).
31 Certification, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/certification (last visited Mar. 8,
2021) (listing an annual certification fee of $50,000 for companies with revenue of
$750,000,000 to $999,900,000 per year; companies with one billion or more in annual
revenue require a separately negotiated fee, presumably higher than $50,000, depending
on the complexity and size of the business).
32 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity Through Public
Benefit Corporations, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 525, 548 (2017) (“Scholars of social
enterprise have previously noted that the main benefit of new hybrid corporate forms
such as the public benefit corporation has been branding.”); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit
Corporations--A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 622 (2011)
(“The third reason founders and operators of social enterprises may find a hybrid form
attractive is to help them to create a distinctive brand.”).
33 Joseph W. Yockey, The Compliance Case for Social Enterprise, 4 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1, 45 (2014) (“Another says that organizing as a benefit
corporation ‘opened me up to a whole network of, not only like-minded people, but also
people who had achieved so much and that could inspire me to do the same.’”).
34 For B Corps, B LAB, https://bcorporation.net/for-b-corps (last visited Mar. 8,
2018) (noting discounts).
35 See generally, DELOITTE, THE DELOITTE MILLENNIAL SURVEY (2014), https://w
ww2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/About-Deloitte/gx-dttl2014-millennial-survey-report.pdf (discussing millennials’ interest in businesses with
social goals).
36 Sustainable Business Tax Credit, CITY OF PHILA., https://www.phila.gov/services/
payments-assistance-taxes/tax-credits/sustainable-business-tax-credit/ (last visited Mar.
10, 2021) (providing up to $4,000 tax credit; to be eligible, the company must be certified
by B Lab).
37 Lydia Segal, Benefit Corporations: A Step Towards Reversing Capitalism's Crisis of
Legitimacy?, 24 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 97, 119–210 (2017) (“Although benefit corporations
must make public an annual benefit report, the report is not audited or certified by a third
party.”).
30
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party standard must be used to measure social impact and an annual
benefit report is generally required.38 However, B Lab only charges for the
certification and provides the standard free for public use.39 Further, there
is currently no state auditing of the contents of the benefit reports. 40
Purported benefits of the benefit corporation include the ability to fully
deduct charitable contributions as a business expense, protection from
profit-focused shareholder lawsuits, and access to certain socially-minded
providers of capital.41 While there have been some benefit corporations to
raise significant capital, it is not clear whether the entity type is more of a
help or more of a hindrance in raising capital.42
A. The B Lab Model
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation was drafted by Bill Clark,
senior counsel at Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, and promoted by
nonprofit B Lab (“The B Lab Model”).43 The B Lab Model, on which most
38 William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are Redefining
the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 846 (2012) (citing MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 5-6C-08 (West 2021); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11
(West 2020)).
39 Id.
40 See id. at 846–47; Frederick H. Alexander, Benefit Corporations Are Ready for 2018,
FREDERICKALEXANDER.NET (Dec. 20, 2017), https://frederickalexander.net/2018/01
/09/benefit-corporations-are-ready-for-2018/.
41 Allen Bromberger, IRS Says Benefit Corporations May Treat Payments to Charity as a
Business Expense, PERLMAN & PERLMAN (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.perlmanandperl
man.com/irs-says-benefit-corporations-may-treat-payments-charity-business-expense/
(describing the reasoning and background behind the IRS confirming that benefit
corporations may deduct payments to charity); Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, B LAB,
https://benefitcorp.net/benefit-corporations-raising-capital (last visited Mar. 10, 2021)
(describing benefit corporations raising capital through private equity investors and
crowdfunding); Why is Benefit Corp Right for Me?, B LAB, https://benefitcorp.net/busines
ses/why-become-benefit-corp (last visited Mar. 10, 2021) (listing benefits of benefit
corporations); Letter from Karin G. Gross, Senior Technical Reviewer, I.R.S., to
Unknown (Jun. 2, 2016) (available at https://www.morganlewis.com//media/files/supplemental/2019/16-0063.pdf).
42 Benefit Corporations Raising Capital, B LAB, https://benefitcorp.net/benefitcorporations-raising-capital; Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Financing the Benefit
Corporation, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 793 (2017).
43 The Model Legislation, B LAB, https://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/model-legislation
(last visited Mar. 10, 2021); William H. Clark, FAERGE DRINKER, https://www.faegredr
inker.com/en/professionals/c/clark-william-h#!#tab-Overview (last visited Mar. 10,
2021).
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of the benefit corporation statutes are based, has been revised a number
of times, and contains the following four main components: (1) purpose,
(2) director/officer conduct, (3) benefit enforcement proceedings, (4)
benefit reporting.44 First, the B Lab Model purpose is to create “[a]
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole,
from the business and operations of a benefit corporation assessed taking
into account the impacts of the benefit corporation as reported against a
third-party standard.”45 Second, directors and officers are to consider the
effects on corporate stakeholders, though directors and officers are
exonerated from monetary liability for disinterested actions or “for failure
of the benefit corporation to pursue or create general public benefit or
specific public benefit.”46 Third, shareholders may bring a benefit
enforcement proceeding for failure of duties under the statute, but
monetary damages may not be recovered, making the proceeding fairly
weak.47 Fourth, the B Lab Model requires annual benefit reports that are
publicly posted and measured against a third-party standard, but the
reporting requirements are mostly just narrative rather than any quantified
metrics.48
B. The Delaware Model
Delaware’s public benefit corporation (PBC) statute departed
significantly from the B Lab Model.49 Colorado had actually pushed for a
similar statute before Delaware, but reportedly received some resistance
from B Lab. After Delaware passed its statute, Colorado was able to pass
a statute largely based on the Delaware Model.50 Delaware’s statute states
44 B LAB, MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION (2017), https://benefitc
orp.net/sites/default/files/
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf.
45 Id. § 102. Some statutes also have a benefit director or benefit officer, placed in
charge of spearheading the socially-focused efforts of the benefit corporation. See, e.g., id.
§ 302.
46 Id. § 301(c).
47 Id. § 305.
48 Id. §§ 401, 402.
49 See generally, J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware's Public Benefit
Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345 (2014) (The Delaware statute has been
amended since publication of this article).
50 Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 390–94 (2017)
(describing some of the legislative history and substance of the Delaware and Colorado
statutes).
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that PBCs are “intended to produce a public benefit or public benefits and
to operate in a responsible and sustainable manner.”51 Directors are
instructed to manage PBCs “in a manner that balances the stockholders’
pecuniary interests, the best interests of those materially affected by the
corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits identified
in its certificate of incorporation purpose statement.”52 Delaware only
requires benefit reports once every two years and does not require that
they be publicly posted.53 Delaware allows, but does not require, the use
of a third-party standard.54 Colorado’s benefit corporation law largely
follows the Delaware Model, but Colorado does require a third-party
standard and annual reporting.55 The Delaware Model is more of an
enabling act when contrasted against the prescriptions of the B Lab
Model.56
C. The Washington Model
Washington state passed the first “social purpose corporation” statute
in the United States, and California later renamed its similar “flexible
purpose corporation” statute to match.57 California also has a B Lab Model
benefit corporation statute. The Washington Model is defined by allowing
a specific social purpose and not engaging in the broad social language
seen in the B Lab Model, or (to a lesser extent) in the Delaware Model.58
Annual, publicly accessible social reporting is required, though use of a
third-party standard is not.59 Minnesota allows its entrepreneurs a choice
between a B Lab Model entity it calls a “general benefit corporation” and
a Washington Model entity it calls a “specific benefit corporation.” 60

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2020).
Id. §§ 362(a), 365.
53 Id. § 366.
54 Id.
55 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-101-507 (West 2021) (The Colorado statute also has
appraisal rights for shareholders who vote against conversion to a PBC. Delaware
originally had a similar provision but deleted it to make it easier to convert. COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7-101-504 (West 2021)).
56 Loewenstein, supra note 50, at 393–94.
57 Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding For-Profit Social
Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299, 304 (2013).
58 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.020-30 (West 2021).
59 Id. § 23B.25.150; CAL. CORP. CODE § 3501 (West 2021).
60 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.104 (West 2021).
51
52
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Unlike the Washington Model, the Minnesota statute does require use of
a third-party standard for its specific benefit corporations.61
Model

Public
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Benefit

Benefit
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Report -

Report -

Timing

Public

Purpose

Posting
B Lab

General

Required

Annual

Required

Delaware

General

Expressly

Biennial

Optional

AND

Optional
Annual

Required

Specific
Washington

General

Not

OR

Mentioned

Specific

(MN
requires)

61

Id. § 304A.301.
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IV. THE HOPE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
A. Norms and Law
Critics of social enterprise law often focus on the fact that traditional
corporate law already allows for significant attention to social purpose. 62
Critics also note the strength of the business judgment rule protection and
the paucity of corporate law mandating shareholder primacy.63 The strong
shareholder wealth centric statements of former Delaware Supreme Court
Chief Justice Leo Strine are largely dismissed as extra-judicial musing.64 As
Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. “Regular” Corporations: A Harmful
Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 13, 2012),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regularcorporations-a-harmful-dichotomy/ (“In fact, for the vast majority of corporate
decisions, there is no legal restriction on directors’ ability to consider the interests of other
stakeholders, including the groups listed in the B Corp statutes.”); see, e.g., Kent
Greenfield, Corporate Citizenship: Goal or Fear?, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 960, 967 (2013)
(“[T]hose [businesses] that do opt in could have behaved positively without the legal
protection of the benefit corporation status. Under the ‘business judgment rule’ courts
will only set aside the decisions of management—of any company—if they are tainted
with self-interest or, more rarely, if management is grossly misinformed before acting.
So, under current law, if a board wants to support charitable causes, pay employees more,
or voluntarily reduce pollutive emissions, there is no doubt that they can do so without
fearing legal recourse.”).
63 Greenfield, supra note 62, at 962; see also Mohsen Manesh, Introducing the Totally
Unnecessary Benefit LLC, 97 N.C. L. REV. 603, 622–25 (2019) (“But corporation statutes
do not expressly contemplate the pursuit of profits or profit maximization as a
corporation's sole or even ultimate purpose. The commonly cited cases—Dodge, Revlon,
and eBay—do not compel a different conclusion. Dodge is an archaic decision that today
has dubious precedential value. Moreover, the decision's language regarding shareholder
primacy is arguably dicta, and not part of the court's holding. Further, Dodge and eBay
are more appropriately understood as disputes between controlling and minority
shareholders, and, therefore, the judicial assertions in both decisions as to the ultimate
purpose of a corporation must be understood in that specific context and not as a broader
judicial mandate that corporations must always maximize shareholder wealth . . . . In most
cases, the board’s exercise of this statutory power is protected from judicial or
shareholder second-guessing by the judge-made doctrine of the business judgment rule.
Under the business judgment rule, in the absence of bad faith or a conflict of interest,
courts will not entertain a shareholder lawsuit challenging a board decision that ‘can be
attributed to any rational business purpose.’”).
64 Manesh, supra note 63, at 624 (“Finally, regarding the academic writing of Chief
Justice Strine, those extrajudicial musings have no legal force, even if the chief justice's
personal beliefs are provocative and influential. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the
chief justice has left it to academic articles, rather than written judicial opinions, to
espouse his views on shareholder primacy.”).
62
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to Milton Friedman’s highly cited article entitled The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, it is noted that the article is more nuanced
than the title suggests.65
There is admittedly limited enforcement of shareholder primacy in
corporate law. The few cases that do exist, however, contribute to the
norm of shareholder wealth maximization within traditional
corporations.66 Claims by well-known figures like former Chief Justice
Strine and Milton Friedman further bolster the norm.67 As has been noted,
Friedman’s article is more nuanced than the title or the famous quotes, but
it is easy for busy directors to disregard nuance.68 Even if the law and
norms are rarely enforced, directors will often do what is expected of
them, especially when, as explained in the next section, the structure of
corporate governance and the incentives are placed to encourage focus on
shareholders.69
Social enterprise forms seek to disrupt the norm. Just names like
“benefit corporations” and “social purpose corporations” suggest that
these forms are not shareholder-focused, but rather focused on the
broader society. Granted, while the name may signal a social focus to many,

Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32–33, 122–26 (noting that businesses should play within
the “rules of the game” and may engage in socially beneficial activities aimed at the longrun interests of the corporation) (available at http://umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedm
an.pdf); Luca Enriques, Missing in Today’s Shareholder Value Maximization Credo: The
Shareholders, PROMARKET (Sept. 22, 2020), https://promarket.org/2020/09/22/miltonfriedman-value-maximization-credo-is-missing-the-shareholders/ (“Looking after the
well-being of employees, devoting resources to the firm’s local communities, and so on
may well be (and, as a rule, will be) in the long-term interest of corporations. Indeed,
cloaking these actions under the label of CSR, as it was fashionable to do in 1970 (and is
again today), can in itself contribute to increasing profits.”).
66 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993).
67 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Charge
of Control Transactions: Is There Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1176 (2002);
Friedman, supra note 65.
68 Enriques, supra note 65; Friedman, supra note 65.
69 Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World with Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 947,
965 (2008) (noting the ongoing academic debate over shareholder wealth as an objective,
but then stating that “there is little doubt that by law and norm, the managers feel
constrained to put shareholders first”).
65

2021]

THE HISTORY AND HOPE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE FORMS

219

it may also attract those wishing to profit off of the good name. 70 While
there will always be some fraud and misuse with any form, if the structure
of corporate governance and the incentives are not reconsidered, positive
change is likely to be limited.71
B. Incentives and Structure
In traditional corporations, shareholders hold the stick of
accountability. Shareholders elect directors, sue directors derivatively on
behalf of the corporation, and can make books and records demands.
While benefit corporations purport to have the purpose of making “[a]
material positive impact on society and the environment,” the
accountability structure is virtually identical to traditional corporations.72
In benefit corporations and similar social enterprise forms,
shareholders—not other stakeholders—hold the accountability tools.73
Likewise, the carrots in traditional corporations generally favor
shareholders. Directors are often paid in stock options and are publicly
commended for rises in stock price.74 With benefit corporations, there has
Amy K. Lehr, Fiduciary Duties for A Globalized World: Stakeholder Theory Reconceived,
27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 81, 109 n.155 (2019) (“Some argue that the public benefit
requirement combined with ambiguous duties to stakeholders heightens the risk of
corporate whitewashing, which could in the long run undermine the reputations of
benefit corporations.”).
71 Joseph W. Yockey, The Compliance Case for Social Enterprise, 4 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 1, 32 (2014).
72 The Model Legislation, supra note 43 (limiting standing to sue derivatively to
shareholders, and shareholders are the only stakeholders with rights to demand the
benefit report). But see Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of Corporate Social
Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 294 (2014) (arguing that the
reporting and third-party standard requirements may cut against whitewashing by benefit
corporations).
73 Justin Blount & Kwabena Offei-Danso, The Benefit Corporation: A Questionable
Solution to a Non-Existent Problem, 44 ST. MARY'S L.J. 617, 639–40 (2013) (“[E]ven though
it expressly disavows shareholder primacy and articulates this new public benefit
corporate purpose, the MBCL retains much of the existing corporate structure by leaving
ultimate accountability in the hands of the shareholders in the form of voting rights and
the benefit enforcement proceeding.”).
74 Sanjai Bhagat et al., Getting Incentives Right: Is Deferred Bank Executive Compensation
Sufficient?, 31 YALE J. REG. 523, 544 (2014) (“Director compensation typically consists of
a cash component (called the retainer), smaller cash amounts paid for attendance at board
and committee meetings, and incentive compensation in the form of stock and stock
option grants which vest over a period of time of a few years. . . . We think that it is
70
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not been much publicized departure from this practice, though perhaps
options with a much longer time horizon would better align incentives
with stakeholder interests. For example, perhaps options with an exercise
date far in the future (25 or 50 years) would focus directors on the
stakeholders who are necessary to carry the corporation that far. 75 Perhaps
directors would not be sufficiently motivated to serve by compensation
they could not access in their lifetime, but possibly it would attract
directors motivated by the good of following generations. And reasonable
cash compensation could be provided as well to hire the necessary director
talent.
In addition to the incentives, the structure of governance in social
enterprises could be amended. There are many different possibilities that
have been proposed. More stakeholders could be given standing to sue.76
More stakeholders could be given the ability to elect directors to the board.
In larger companies, stakeholder representatives could be elected, and then
the stakeholder representatives could be vested with the powers of
shareholders in a traditional corporation.77 Stakeholders could be involved
in creating and monitoring a plan to benefit the public.78 Long-term
shareholders could receive increased voting rights.79 Social reporting could
be not only mandated, but also enforced and made less vague. Social
plausible to assume that incentives operate similarly in both employment positions. If,
for example, directors can liquidate their vested stock and options, and a director feels
the need to liquidate the position in the near future, then the director may focus on shortterm performance that may be to the detriment of long-term shareholder value and the
public fisc.”).
75 Cf. Kent Greenfield, The Impact of “Going Private” on Corporate Stakeholders, 3 BROOK.
J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 75, 80 (2008) (“So if short-term management hurts stakeholders
and long-term management benefits stakeholders, privatization may be a positive trend
for stakeholders because it frees managers to manage with a longer time horizon and
without the need for immediate accountability in the form of profits.”).
76 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 89, 127–31 (2015) (making arguments in favor of stakeholder standing).
77 See generally, J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J.
61 (2017).
78 Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the Separation of Benefit and Control, 39
CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1788, 1820–21 (2018).
79 COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US
AND HOW TO RESTORE TRUST IN IT 246–47 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013) (arguing for
“time-dependent shareholdings” where long-term shareholders receive increased voting
rights). But see Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE
L.J. 1554, 1563–64 (2015).
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enterprise status could be limited to companies in certain industries or
with certain hiring practices or compensation metrics. Executive
compensation could be capped, and employee compensation could be
mandated at a living wage or better. The options are numerous, but this
Article contends that the state bestowing a social sounding moniker on a
business type should come with governance requirements that elevate
non-shareholder stakeholders’ rights.
V. CONCLUSION
After recounting a brief history of the social enterprise forms in the
United States, this Article makes two primary arguments: (1) social
enterprise forms are more needed to combat the shareholder wealth
maximization norm than they are needed to combat a restriction of
traditional corporate law and (2) to ensure the social enterprise forms have
staying power and are not eventually discredited as white washing vehicles,
the statutes need to be amended to support superior outcomes for nonshareholder stakeholders.

